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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CONVENTION ON THE 
CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING 
RESOURCES 
 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is a conglomeration of international agreements which 
have evolved from the Antarctic Treaty (1957) to form a legal framework to manage the 
Antarctic whilst circumventing competing territorial claims. The Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (1980) is an integral part of the 
ATS framework as the international agreement which forms the regulatory basis for 
conservation and harvesting activities in Antarctic waters. Demanding seas, a short season 
due to ice coverage and limited markets for Antarctic fish have resulted in relatively small 
amounts of fish being caught south of the Antarctic convergence; except for within the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the British, French and Argentine territories in the 
region. However, fishing in the region is increasing as new technologies provide for viable 
and safe fishing operations and as fish stocks become increasingly depleted in other parts of 
the world.  
 
Each October and November signatories to CCAMLR meet at the CCAMLR Secretariat offices 
in Hobart, Australia to set the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the coming season and 
formulate necessary Conservation Measures to regulate harvesting activities the CCAMLR 
management area. There are presently 34 signatories to the Convention, with 24 parties 
meeting the criteria for decision-making capabilities in the Commission meetings (CCAMLR, 
1980; refer also CCAMLR, 2007).1 Of the 33 nation-state signatories, 12 are member states 
of the EU, of which eight are members of the Commission. Signatories to CCAMLR that are 
EU member states are represented at Community level by a delegation from the European 
Union’s Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG Fish). However, both the 
United Kingdom and France attend the meeting to represent their overseas territories in 
the region and delegates from EU member-states that are signatories to the Convention are 
welcome to attend. Given these multiple layers of European representation, this analysis 
will seek to establish how the EU interests are represented in practice. Specifically, 1) how 
do structural and institutional aspects of the EU shape the positions taken by its delegation; 
and 2) how does this arrangement impact upon CCAMLR and its decision-making process? 
 
                                                 
1 A list of signatories is included in Appendix Two. 
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Framework for Analysis and Methodology 
This paper opens by briefly providing contextual background information on CCAMLR and its 
operations. The second section introduces the EU, with special attention being placed on 
the implications of structural aspects of the Union and its policy process. The third section 
analyses the CCAMLR Commission meetings and the EU’s involvement, before focusing on 
two recent issues that highlight the structural challenges between the decision-making 
processes of CCAMLR and the competencies of the EU. The four section summaries the 
findings from the previous section and places these in a broader context, noting a number 
of pressures for change. The fifth section finishes with some conclusions.  
 
Much of the technical information presented in this paper has been drawn from primary 
documentation issued by the CCAMLR Secretariat and the European Commission. Reports 
from CCAMLR Commission meetings are publicly made available and provide summary of 
both the procedural and decision-making aspects of the Commission meetings. EU policy 
documentation is made publicly available the Eur-Lex and Pre-Lex portals on the European 
Commission’s website.2 Eur-Lex is a searchable database providing access to introduced EU 
legislation and decisions. Pre-Lex is the equivalent database for documents formulated 
during the policy-making process. Together they provide an official record of the Union’s 
policy-making activities as part of the Official Journal. However, the key challenge in 
analysing decision-making systems is that the official documents seldom reflect the 
political process of decision-making. If decision-making is conceptualised as being made in 
a ‘black box’, it is necessary to identify how various pressures, interests, values and 
structural components collide to shape an outcome (for example refer Kingdon, 1995). 
Consequently, the challenge is to identify: firstly, which factors are crucial in shaping 
outcomes; and secondly, how these factors may shape future decisions. To gain insight into 
both the CCAMLR and EU decision-making forums, a series of interviews were conducted 
with persons who attend the CCAMLR meetings. All interviews were informal, unstructured, 
off the record and, largely, conducted via telephone over a period of approximately 45 
                                                 
2 Refer Appendix One for a list of Key Website Addresses. 
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minutes. The purpose of the interviews was to gain a fuller appreciation of the CCAMLR 
decision-making process and the role that the EU delegation plays in the meetings.3  
 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
CCAMLR was negotiated following increasing international recognition of the importance of 
krill in the Southern Ocean eco-system and amid concerns amongst the Antarctic Treaty 
signatories that the harvesting of krill from the Southern Ocean could have a detrimental 
impact on Antarctic marine life; particularly birds, seals and fish. Pursuant to Article IX of 
the Antarctic Treaty, which obliges signatories to take measures that uphold the 
“preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica” (Antarctic Treaty, Article 
IX (f)), the signatories embarked on the negotiation of an agreement to achieve these 
obligations in Antarctic waters. 
The resultant CCAMLR Convention was negotiated in the late-1970s and signed in 
1980 by 22 original signatories, including the forerunner to the EU, the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The guiding rationale and spirit of the Convention is the conservation of 
Antarctic marine living resources, whereby the term “conservation” is defined as including 
“rational use” (CCAMLR, 1980, Article II). Examination of the Convention shows that it is 
largely concerned with the structural and procedures aspects of the Conventions decision-
making and management bodies in the form of the Commission, the Scientific Committee 
and the administrative Secretariat.  
 
The CCAMLR management area covers water south of the Antarctic convergence which is 
approximately 50-60o South. As is standard management practice in Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs), the management area is divided into sub-areas which 
form the basis of both data collection and fisheries operations.4 However, CCAMLR 
fundamentally differs from standard RFMO mechanisms on two aspects ― both of which are 
a directly linked to the conservation objectives of the ATS. Firstly, it is important to note 
                                                 
3 A list of interviews can be found in Appendix Three. 
4 A map showing CCAMLR management area and administrative sub-areas is included in Appendix Four. 
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that the Convention is both ‘precautionary’ and conservation focused.5 Similar to standard 
RFMO agreements, Article II (3) of the Convention stipulates that all activities undertaken 
in relation to harvesting activities must ensure the “prevention of decrease in the size of 
any harvested population to levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment” ((a)). 
However, in addition to this requirement, sub-article (b) broadens the scope to include the 
“maintenance of ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources” and sub-article (c) requires any potential 
changes to be natural reversible within two to three decades. The result of these 
obligations is that signatories wishing to harvest in the CCAMLR management area must be 
able to demonstrate significantly robust scientist evidence that their harvesting is not 
adversely affecting the ecological food web and that their activities are not detrimental to 
Antarctic marine life, including birds and sea mammals. CCAMLR also differs from standard 
RFMOs in that, as a part of the ATS, it is subject to the broader positioning and disputes 
relating to territorial claims over the Antarctic. All seven Antarctic claimants are 
signatories to CCAMLR, with the two EU member state claimants - the United Kingdom and 
France - both having overseas territories in the region. Molenaar argues that despite these 
differences, there is no evidence to suggest that CCAMLR is less effective than other 
RFMOs; and while these qualities make it unlike any other RFMO, CCAMLR may be best 
conceptualised as “something more” than an RFMO (2001, p.499) ― rather than something 
different. 
Finally, it is important to note that Article VI of the Convention specifically 
excludes whales and seals from CCAMLR’s ‘natural living resources’ remit (which is 
otherwise not defined), noting that that these species are covered under the International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the Convention on the Conservation of 




                                                 
5 CCAMLR is often cited as being obliged to take a ‘precautionary approach’ (for example, refer the CCAMLR 
website). However, the term does not appear in the Convention, and may be better regarded as a guiding principle 
or spirit of the Convention.  
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CCAMLR Decision-Making 
The scope of the Convention, its precautionary modus operandi and conservation 
objectives, result in a strong technical and scientific focus within the annual meetings. 
These meetings are conducted annually at the CCAMLR Secretariat offices in Hobart, 
Tasmania, Australia over the final three weeks of October and into the first week of 
November. The first three weeks of meetings are allocated for the Scientific Committee to 
compile data submitted from various signatories on the status of fish stocks and the general 
eco-system within the each of the CCAMLR sub-areas. Reports from this series of meetings 
form the decision-making data for the Commission meetings in the four week (usually the 
first week of November). The Commission is comprised of a representative from each of the 
CCAMLR signatories who meet the criteria laid out in the Convention. Under these 
requirements each of the founding 22 CCAMLR signatories are automatically granted 
decision-making rights by becoming members of the Commission. Additional signatories may 
become a member of the Commission (and hence obtain decision-making rights) by 
demonstrating active research or marine harvesting activities in the CCAMLR management 
area (CCAMLR, 1980, Article VII).   
The Convention deems that matters of substance the Commission is obliged to take 
decisions by consensus (Article XII). As Molenaar notes, because ‘consensus’ has not been 
defined in the Convention, it has traditionally been “applied as meaning the absences of 
formal objection” (2001, p. 470). In cases where an issue is deemed as not being a matter 
of substance, a simple majority of representatives present and voting is sufficient. 
However, the established culture is for all decisions to be taken by consensus and, as of the 
present, there is yet to be a decision made under voting arrangement prescribed for 
matters not of substance.  
 
The combination of CCAMLR’s precautionary approach, the technocratic nature of the 
Scientific Committee and the consensual decision-making mechanisms tend to provide those 
signatories who have the relevant resources and expertise to be able to formulate robust 
scientific evidence with a stronger negotiating position in Commission meetings. These 
countries include: Australia who primarily fishes to the south of their continent; New 
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Zealand who specialises in fisheries in the Ross Sea region; the British and French delegates 
who actively management fisheries in their territories of South Shetlands, South Georgia 
and Kerguelen and Crozet Islands, respectively; and the Southern American fishing nation of 
Chile. Special mention should also be made of the United States of America who less 
activity engages in the Commission meetings, but conducts significant fishing activities in 
the region and - along with the EU - is a key importer of fish to supply domestic markets. 
While these signatories strength is tempered by the consensual decision-making system; 
technical argument and broad agreement amongst this group plays an important in shaping 
the decisions and measures that are being considered by the Commission.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the CCAMLR Convention operates in concert with other 
international agreements including the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.  
 
The European Union 
The EU is one of the 22 original signatory to CCAMLR. The Commission of the EEC partook in 
the CCAMLR negotiations under its obligations of Article 38 of the Treaty of Rome (1957). 
The CCAMLR Convention was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 1981 
(Council of Ministers, 1981) and the EC acceded to the Convention before its 
implementation in 1982.   
 
Article VII of the Convention makes specific provision for the accession of a “regional 
economic integration organisation”, granting them the same rights and obligations as state 
signatories. Given the usual situation whereby both the delegates of DG Fish and EU 
member states are present at the Commission meetings, the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission (CCAMLR, 1994, Rule 4) stipulate that the number of votes from a the member 
states of a regional economic integration organisation much not exceed the number of 
member states to the Convention, so as to not provide the EU with an additional vote.  
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The European Commission reports on its website that between one and three, mainly 
Spanish, vessels fish in the CCAMLR management area each season (European Commission, 
2007). 
 
The Structure of the European Union 
Observers of nation-states are unlikely to recognise the institutions and structure of the 
European Union. The gradual development of the Union through the successive negotiations 
and treaties has resulted in a set of structural arrangements that are both esoteric and 
eclectic.  
The Union may possibly be best conceptualised as providing an additional collective 
function on a variety of areas – such as a larger internal market, a single currency, greater 
international power and European peace – which the Member States are ill-equipped to 
deliver individually (for example refer Haas, 1961; Lindberg, 1963 and 1971; Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet, 1998). In this manner, the Member States have chosen to “forgo the desire 
and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic politicise independently of each other 
seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making in several 
distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new 
centre” (Lindberg, 1971 cited in Tranholm-Mikkelson, 1991) (original emphasis). 
Consequently, as Peterson and Shackleton point out, the EU straddles many of the 
commonly accepted categories of political organisation. “It is less than a federation and 
more than an ordinary regime, a kind of confederation but not yet a Gemeinschaft, neither 
state nor ‘ordinary’ international organization” (Wallace, 1983; Chryssochoou, 2000; 
Peterson, 2001 cited in Peterson and Shackleton 2002, p.1). 
 
The emerging consensus “out of recent scholarship on the EU, it is that the Union has 
become a ‘multi-level’ system of governance” (Peterson and Blomberg, 2000, p.25). This 
consensus has been driven both by the failure of nation-state centred conceptualisations of 
the EU to accurately explain and predict European policy outcomes and by the increasing 
state-like behaviour of the EU itself. Multi-level governance identifies limits on the state 
executive control and argues that both the decision-making mechanisms and structure of 
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the EU favour the EU institutions and particularly the Commission (Marks et al., 1996; also 
refer Tsbelis and Kreppel, 1998). The EU has also been engaging in state-like behaviour on 
the global stage. While a considerable gap remains between the EU’s present capabilities 
and expectations placed upon it by comparing it to other state actors (Hill, 1993), Bulmer 
(1994, p.354-5) explains that “observation of the day-to-day activities of the European 
Community suggests that what is going on is less some mutation of an international 
organisation and more a multi-tiered system of government.” Consequently, the approach 
adopted here is to view the EU as a non-monolithic actor consisting of a variety of 
institutions and actors, situated at a number of different levels and each have both 
capacity to influence and shape policy as well as both procedural and resource constraints 
limiting the degree of that influence. In this manner, while the structure of the EU may 
indeed be unique, the wide variety of organs within the EU system is not unconventional in 
policy-making system and consequently, as Peters (2001, p.79) points out, a legitimate and 
“important approach to this entity [the EU] is to think of it as a political system not all that 
dissimilar to others… the fundamental task of the political system is to make policy…”  
 
 In the case of the EU, the decision-making mechanisms revolve around four distinct 
institutions: the Commission of the European Communities, the European Parliament and 
the European Council of Ministers (incorporating COREPER) and the European Court of 
Justice, each of which have their origins in the 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community [ECSC] or the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Over time, each has undergone a 
series of modifications with subsequent revisions of the Treaties. It is the unique shape of 
these unique institutions and their equally unique relationships with each other and the EU 
Member States which are defining characteristics and a central part of the EU’s 
idiosyncratic nature and a challenge to simple labels and traditional categorisation. 
 
All areas of EU competency and policy, including fisheries responsibilities, are laid out in 
the Treaties. As Bulmer explains (1994, p.364), the Treaties form the most fundamental 
basis of governance in the EU as “the treaties set out the decision-making arrangements 
and formal institutions.” However, the ongoing and open-ended nature of the EU’s project 
 9
means that EU institutions have always operated, and continue to operate, in a highly 
contested environment due to an incessant lack of universal agreement on the twin issues 
of what the EU is and ought to be (Peterson and Shackleton, 2002). This ongoing debate 
around the nature of the European project and the successive revision of the Treaties has 
led to areas of competency and the policy-process being highly contested. In the case of 
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), as will be discussed shortly, this lead to the principle 
agreement on the need for a CFP being reached in 1957, however, the operational working 
of such a policy where not agreed upon by the member states until 1983 ― after the EEC’s 
accession to CCAMLR. 
 
Policy areas in which the EU member states have agreed to make collective are largely 
managed by the European Commission. This executive-styled body is obligated to meet the 
tasks set out for it under the Treaties by the member states. In is comprised of a number of 
Directorates-General which are segregated along policy lines and specialist offices called 
‘Services’. The Commission is not a monolithic actor and may better be deemed a “multi-
organisation” (Pollack, 1998, p.219) due to the complexity of the interrelations among its 
various parts. Fisheries competencies in the current Barroso Commission are managed by 
the Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG Fish) under Maltese 
Commission Joe Borg.  
As the final decision-taker, the European Council of Minister plays a critical role the 
EU policy process. However, despite its role as the EU’s chief decision-making body, like 
the Commission, it would be ill-conceived to think of it as a homogenous institution. In 
fact, as Bulmer points out (1994, p.364) the Council has a more complex institutional 
structure than the Commission as it is organised “not just by hierarchies of portfolios but 
also by member state.” The Council may most easily be envisaged as a layered triangle 
comprising the European Council at the apex of the triangle followed by the Council of 
Ministers, with COREPER and other senior preparatory groups in successive layers beneath 
(Hayes-Renshaw, 2002). It structure is further complicated by the multiple configurations 
that the Council can take. The Council of Minister meetings are comprised of the respective 
national minister of the Member States. Consequently, there are presently nine different 
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Council configurations. Consequently, “[i]t is thus easier to view the Council as a loose 
composition of distinct national delegates than as a body orientated towards identifying the 
most appropriate collective policy” (Wallace and Wallace, 1996, p.57). Decisions relating to 
Fisheries policy, and CCAMLR in particular, are made by the respective Ministers responsible 
for fisheries from the member states. Decisions are taken in the Council through a system 
of qualified majority voting (QMV) which weighs the respective weight of the Members 
States’ vote according to size. While some decisions have to be taken by unanimity, the 
established culture and practise of the culture of the Council is to reach consensus where 
possible on as many issues as possible. While the Council has no authority to propose or 
amend policy it can obviously refuse to pass proposals it deems to be unsuitable, returning 
them to the Commission for modification. As Wallace and Wallace (1996, p.57) note “many 
participants in the Council would argue that it is precisely the task of the Council to turn 
the more or less bright ideas of the Commission into practical policies” or at least to second 
guess the Commission and to deploy counter-arguments. 
 
The final European institution in the EU policy process is the European Parliament. This 
popularly-elected 785 member body is responsible for providing public scrutiny of policy 
process. Fisheries policy and matters are commonly formulated via the co-decision 
procedure which provides the Parliament join decision-taking responsibilities, along with 
the Council of Ministers. The Parliament’s Fisheries committee is responsible for amending 
and adopting legislative proposals from the Commission and making recommendations to 
Parliament on their passage. It is important to recognise that the Parliament plays an 
important role in the shaping of fisheries policy and objective – as well as monitoring their 
implementation – however, the operation of fisheries policy is managed exclusively by the 
European Commission’s DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs  
 
The Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 
DG Fish’s responsibilities include all aspect of policy management of European fisheries 
operations including European fisheries policy, TACs, monitoring, supporting European 
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fishing communities6, market organisation, and the representation of European fishing 
interest in both bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements. Until the Commission 
restructuring in 2004 by Commission President José Manuel Barroso, fisheries issues were 
integrated in the operations of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Fisheries due to 
their commonly derived competencies in the Treaty of Rome. The creation of a specific 
Directorate-General to manage fisheries competencies coincided with the Council of 
Ministers approval of the 2002 Commission proposal for an updated CFP, and the 
enlargement of the EU to 25 member states. 
 
The Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG Fish) originally derives its competencies to 
manage European fish stocks from the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community7 (1957), Article 38, which is also the founding legal basis for the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural 
products. “Agricultural products” means the products of soil, of stock-farming 
and of fisheries and products of the first-stage processing directly related to 
these products. 
(Treaty of Rome, Article 38.1) 
While the CAP quickly developed to become one of the cornerstones of the Community, the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) developed both more gradually and with less cohesion. 
Negotiations over access to fish stocks within European waters continued amongst the 
Treaty of Rome signatories until 1961 when the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway made 
application to join the Community. As the existing Treaty signatories had traditionally 
fished in the applicant states’ waters, fresh impetus for the signatories to agree to an 
‘equal access principle’ providing open fishing rights to any member state within 
‘Community’. The first steps towards a CFP were taken in 1970 with the creation of a 
regional fisheries area and the implementation of the equal access principle (with the 
retention of limited access to narrow strips of water near fishing communities) to 
Community waters. It was the emergence of the 200-miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
during the negotiation of the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea that kick 
                                                 
6 A key component of the CFP since the inception of European fisheries competencies in the Treaty of Rome has 
been to utilise fishing operations to support coastal communities (refer Treaty of Rome, Article 38).  
7 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome. 
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started a cohesive Community fisheries policy. In November 1976, the European Council of 
Ministers declared the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the Community (European 
Council of Ministers, 1976a) following a Council Regulation on a structural policy for the 
European fishing industry (European Council of Ministers, 1976b). Finally, in 1983 – after the 
negotiation and implementation of the CCAMLR Convention and the conclusion of 
protracted European negotiations - the Council of Ministers approved a regulation to 
establish a Community fisheries management system (European Council of Ministers, 1983). 
The policy consists of four main areas relating to the conservation and management of fish 
stocks, specifically: the conservation of fish stocks, market rules, regulation on structural 
issues such as the financing of vessels, port facilities and fish processing plans, and external 
policy. 
 
Following the near collapse of European fish stocks, the first major re-think of European 
fishing policy was conducted in 2001 and an updated – and more conservation and 
sustainable focused - CFP was approved in 2002 by the Council of Ministers (European 
Council of Ministers, 2002) (refer also Payne, 2000).  
Both the Commission Green Paper and the resultant Council Regulation on CFP are 
primarily focused in European domestic fish stock management and contain limited 
reference to the scope and role of the Community in the international arena. The sole 
article pertaining to external relations in the 2002 CFP is Article 30 which relates to 
commitments in RFMOs and the allocation of RFMO fish stocks (European Commission, 
2002). The document is conspicuously silent on the Union’s objectives, roles and procedures 
in external fisheries. It is important to recognise that the CFP, throughout all stages of its 
development, has largely been internally focused on the management of fish stocks in 
European waters. The external relations component of the EU competencies, while not 
explicit in the 2002 CFP regulation, are derived from the same precedents as the Common 




Matters pertaining to CCAMLR are managed by Directorate B, External Policy and Markets, 
of DG Fish, in International and Regional Arrangements unit (B2). The unit presently 
contains six officials with one principle administer for CCAMLR.  
 EU positions are negotiated internally prior to the CCAMLR meetings over a period 
of almost a year. The present process usually involves a series of two to three technical 
meetings which are attended by the CCAMLR Principle Administer and the Heads of 
Delegation to CCAMLR from the EU member states. At the conclusion of the technical 
meetings, the European Commission formulates a mandate which is submitted to the 
European Council of Ministers for approval by the regulation procedure.  
 
CCAMLR Commission Meetings  
Signatories to CCAMLR meet once a year over four weeks in October and November to reach 
agreement on the TACs for the forthcoming season and to attend to business of the 
Convention. The first three weeks are allocated for the business of the Science Committee 
meetings. All data brought to this meeting is gathered and prepared by signatories who 
wish to undertake fishing operations in the CCAMLR management area. As allocations are 
allocated by sub-area and species, data from the CCAMLR species is compiled by the 
committee in such as manner. Data is submitted solely by the signatories, the decision-
making process significantly advantages those signatories who have the resources and 
expertise in fish stocks management in which that they wish to harvest. Consequently, 
there is a strong correlation between the quality of data brought to the Scientific 
Committee and the level of engagement in the region. Signatories such as Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, France and Chile all actively manage their local 
fisheries in the broader Southern Ocean region, have significant experience fishing in 
CCAMLR waters and are engaged Antarctic Treaty signatories.  
Significant discrepancies may exist between signatories’ evaluations of acceptable 
levels of harvesting. This is most notable between those signatories identified above, and 
those who might be regarded as taking a short-term interest in fisheries managements such 
as the Federation of Russia and other Eastern European and Asian nations. This divergence 
of goals is one that continues to challenge the operations of the Convention and will be 
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returned to later in greater detail under the subject of IUU fishing. However, at this point, 
it is important to note that such differences of option are commonly resolved in a technical 
manner. With significantly more sophisticated and robust scientific methods, the key, 
engaged signatories of CCAMLR are commonly able to override alternate proposals by, 
sidestepping the issue of fishing management goals and, focusing on the establishment and 
implementation of rigorous fishing stock management methodology.  
It is important to note that the TACs set at Commission meetings does not specific 
individual access or allocation. The TAC is set for all notified vessel who wish to fish in a 
sub-area. Fisheries are opened when sufficient access through the sea ice is available to the 
vessels and in closed when the TAC has been reached for the season. This management 
technique encourages ‘olympic-styled’ fishing, where fishing operators have a strong 
incentive to gain as greater portion of the TAC as possible, and consequently, fish as early 
in the season as possible. 
Differences between CCAMLR signatories’ capacities are further reinforced in 
practise when fishing in the Southern Ocean. Ice floes, fickle weather and migratory fish 
stocks combine to make fishing in the CCAMLR management area both challenging and 
demanding. Those signatories that have established more advanced fish stock management 
techniques have generally simultaneously developed more advanced fishing techniques. 
With significant expenditure involved in operating a fishing vessel in such distant and 
demanding waters, it is generally these vessels that are able to run viable operations. This 
has two affects: firstly, traditionally it has served to reinforce the cycle of engaged 
fisheries management; and secondly, it has provided significant motive and opportunity for 
IUU fishing amongst the poorer performing fisheries operators.   
The link between technical/scientific competency and political influence at 
Commission meetings is a challenge for the EU delegation as the competencies for fish 
stock research fall to the EU member states. This factor weakens the EU’s position vis-à-vis 
the other signatories ― as well as weakening its position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and 
France, both of whom have gaining significant technical competency from the management 
of their overseas territory fish stocks.  
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The obligations of the CCAMLR signatories under Article II of the Convention to consider 
affects of the wider eco-system when setting to TACs is a central component of the CCAMLR 
decision-making process. The complexities of food web science and significant gaps in 
knowledge, both reinforce the precautionary approach prescribed in the Convention and 
the negotiating advantage of those signatories that can bring robust scientific evidence to 
the table.   
CCAMLR’s broader eco-system approach also presents a number of challenges for 
the EU as it demarcates the limits of the EU’s fisheries competence. Like research, 
environmental matters – such as, those pertaining to seabirds, sharks and Antarctic 
mammals - are a matter of competency for the EU member states. While delegations to 
Commission meetings will commonly include representatives from relevant government 
agencies, scientific advisors, industry and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the EU 
delegation is solely comprised of representatives from DG Fish and industry delegates. Due 
to the scope of the Convention and EU competencies, the delegation has never included a 
representative from Directorate-General for the Environment, for example. Consequently, 
on matters outside, or at the limit of, the Union’s competencies there may be not uniform 
European perspective. Delegates from EU member-states may voice opinions that 
substantively differ from the perspectives of DG Fish or other EU member states. This 
appears to have become more prevalent in recent years as delegations from EU member 
states that are non-fishing nations - but CCAMLR signatories - seek to raise environmental 
standards and further embed the Convention’s precautionary approach. To maintain a 
working consensus through the Commission meetings, delegates from DG Fish and the EU 
member states commonly meet each morning before the Commission plenary and engage in 
break-out sessions if required. The EU group of countries seek to manage this issue by 
making and supporting proposals in tandem. For example, at CCAMLR XXV the French 
brought a proposal which was submitted at committee stage on the conservation of sharks 
in CCAMLR waters. The proposal was supported by the EU delegation; despite this matter 
being outside the Union’s competencies.  
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Individuals play a critical role in the Commission decision-making process due to both their 
personality and institutional knowledge. By all accounts the head of the United Kingdom 
delegation, Mike Richardson, and the former head of the Argentine delegation, Ministro 
Ariel Mansi have both made invaluable contributions to the Commission meetings. Both 
individuals played key roles in the negotiation and formation of the CCAMLR Convention and 
have accumulated substantial knowledge on the Convention as well as an understanding of 
fisheries management science and the requirements of fisheries operations. This knowledge 
can be brought into play at crucial times in the decision-making process, particularly when 
precedent has already been set, or when decisions are being taken on established 
principles.  
 In relation to the EU delegation, the existing relationships and greater institutional 
knowledge particularly of the United Kingdom delegates to the Commission meetings has 
further strengthen their position in relation to the delegation from DG Fish, which has seen 
as greater turnover of representation. This resource can, of course, also be advantageous to 
the Union, as a multi-pronged approach may be brought to the meeting on a common 
European position. However, clearly the personal political strength of delegates from EU 
member state countries can be as much a liability as it is an asset.  
 
Due to its unique placement within the ATS, CCAMLR contains added dimensions when 
compared to standard RFMOs. In addition to the conservation and political aspects already 
discussed there are two structural dimensions that shape the CCAMLR decision-making 
environment. Firstly, it is standard practise for the head of delegation to RFMO meetings to 
be from the respective nations’ fisheries ministry. In contrast, heads of delegation to 
CCAMLR are commonly drawn from ministries or units that are responsible for Antarctic 
policy. This situation applies to many delegations including key players such as Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, France and Norway. This continuity of 
representation may help governments coordinate their Antarctic policy as well as 
cohesively build their strategic interests in the Antarctic region. The CCAMLR Convention 
specifically calls on CCAMLR signatories who are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty to 
acknowledge “the special obligations and responsibilities of the environment of the 
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Antarctic Treaty area” (CCAMLR, 1980, Article V (1)), and binds them to requirements 
under Articles I, IV, V and VI of the Antarctic Treaty (Articles III and IV). As Molenaar notes, 
this calls “for cooperation between bodies under the CCAMLR Convention and other bodies 
in the ATS, in particular the Committee for Environmental Protection” (Molenaar, 2001, 
p.473). The present competencies of the EU do not provide sufficient scope for the Union 
to formally engage in such activities.8 However, the flip-side of this arrangement is that 
there is a high degree of consistency in staff and representation from the EU in CCAMLR and 
other RFMOs. This centralisation of institutionalised knowledge may provides the EU with a 
ready over view of RFMOs, and the network of exisiting relationships may prove 
advantageous as CCAMLR becomes increasingly focused on fish stocks that migrate between 
RFMO management areas.  
 
The combination of the CCAMLR decision-making process and the competencies of the EU 
places DG Fish in a potentially challenging position at Commission meetings. The technical 
knowledge which brings political strength both on fish stocks and the broader 
environmental consequences of fishing activities both fall outside the remit of the European 
Commission. Furthermore, established key players in the CCAMLR forum include EU member 
states who may not always share the same objectives as DG Fish. The key issue is the 
broader ‘living marine resources’ scope of the CCAMLR Convention. It is interesting to note 
that the EU opposed the inclusion of this term in the negotiation of the SEAFC Convention 
to manage straddling fish stock in the South-East Atlantic Ocean favouring the narrower 
term of ‘fishery resources’ (refer Miller and Molenaar, 2006) ― a definition which firmly 
provides exclusive competencies for the European Commission.  
 
Incidents and Accidents 
In 1999, at the 18th Commission meeting, the representative from DG Fish issued 
notification, on behalf of the Portuguese vessel Lugalpesca, to conduct exploratory fishing 
                                                 
8 It is interesting to note that the EU competencies, however, did require the drafting of an additional sub-article 
of the Environment Protocol relating to liability arising from national activities undertaken in the Antarctic 




activity in the forthcoming season. The notification proved contentious due to the fact that 
Portugal was not, nor is presently, a signatory to the Convention. The argument presented 
by the DG Fish delegation was that, fisheries is a Union competency, and consequently, any 
EU member state was eligible to engage in notified fishing activity under the Convention. 
This position was challenged by both the Commission Secretariat and other members on a 
number of grounds. Firstly, Molenaar (2001) reports that negative sentiment for this 
proposal stemmed from concerns of the European Commissions’ (in)ability to ensure 
compliance of EU―non-CCAMLR signatories. And secondly, the position presented by DG 
Fish has the affect of exempting EU member states who are not signatories to CCAMLR, but 
wish to fish in the CCAMLR management area, from paying annual subscriptions. Under such 
circumstances, a financial incentive exists for EU member states who are signatories to 
CCAMLR to withdraw from the Convention. The official report of the meeting records the 
EU position as: 
…the European Community and its Member States reiterated that Member 
States of the Community had transferred to the European Community their 
competencies on fisheries. By virtue of this exclusive Community competence, 
the European Community is entitled and obliged to regulate internal or 
external fishing activities of its Member States. Vessels flying the flag of a 
Member State in all regional fisheries organisations, as well as in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), are considered to be Community 
vessels, whether or not a specific provision to this effect is included in the 
respective Conventions. 
 
As a Contracting Party of CCAMLR, the European Community, and consequently 
all its Member States and all Community vessels, are bound by CCAMLR’s 
conservation and control measures, irrespective of whether those Member 
States are Members of CCAMLR or not. In that regard, the European Community 
has responsibilities. 
(CCAMLR, 1999, 9.42 and 9.43) 
 
In this case, Portugal was granted the right to conduct exploratory fishing in the final 
moments of the meeting after sustained pressure from the Union’s delegation (CCAMLR, 
1999, 9.34-41) (refer also, Molenaar, 2001). New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Argentina, South 
Africa and Russia as well as the Secretariat voiced their disapproval of the notification and 
urged Portugal to join the Convention as swiftly as possible (9.48 – 9.52). 9  
                                                 
9 Kaye reports that Portuguese vessels had already been fishing intermittently in the CCAMLR management area 
and was identified at the Commission meeting in 1996 (CCAMLR-XV pp. 25-26 and p.141) (Cited in Molenaar, 2001).   
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The issue never reached a climax as on 21 January 2000 the Executive Secretary of 
the Commission was informed by DG Fish that the Lugalpesca would not conduct 
exploratory fishing activities due to technical issues. Despite a noticeable lack of objections 
from the United Kingdom and France in the Commission meetings, it is widely thought that 
diplomatic pressure brought upon the European Commission from these member states in 
European forums led to a change in position by the European Commission.10
The issue was directly raised again at Commission Meeting XXII (2003) when the 
European Commission again sought to notified a Portuguese-flagged vessel, the Santo 
Antero. Again, objections were raised by signatories (CCAMLR, 2003, 8.23 and 8.24). While 
a divergence of opinion remains between DG Fish and many Commission members, the 
matter was resolved at the European level during European Council of Ministers discussions 
in 2006. COREPER discussions between the European Commission and the respective EU 
member states fisheries ministries concluded that the EU treaty arrangements provided the 
necessary scope for all (now 27) EU member states to be represented by the European 
Commission at CCAMLR and for EU members states to be able to, under Community law, 
fish in the CCAMLR management area. 
The issue briefly flared again during the 2006/07 season when a Polish contracted 
vessel flagged to Malta entered CCAMLR management waters and engaged in harvesting 
activities without re-flagging. Following complaints by several CCAMLR signatories, the 
vessel was promptly flagged to Poland. It seems that while DG Fish has obtained necessary 
approval from the Council of Ministers on this matter, it does not want to bring the issue 
onto the Commission agenda at present.  
 
The increasing commercial value of Antarctic fisheries, improved technology and Antarctic 
fishing techniques, and depletion of other global fish stock has seen increased Illegal, 
Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing activities in CCAMLR management waters. Like 
elsewhere in the globe, the perpetrators are purportedly selected Asian and Eastern 
                                                 
10 At the same meeting, the European Commission drew the Commission’s attention to Scientific Committee 
reports totalling catch statistics by flag state; without indicating which flag states are members of the EU. The 
Commission agreed that the Scientific Committee be advised that all catch statistics for CCAMLR Flag States which 
are also members of the European Community should be listed by Flag State grouped under the heading ‘European 
Community’(CCAMLR, 1999, 8.11). The European Commission raise the issue again the following year (CCAML, 
2000) and also requested the catch documentation relating to EU member states be submitted directly the DF Fish 
(CCAMLR, 2000, 17.1). 
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European nations. IUU fishing may occur within CCAMLR management area via a number of 
avenues. Firstly, there simply may be cases of over-fishing or fishing outside of season 
dates by notified vessels. In such cases, onboard observers are reportedly turning a ‘blind 
eye’ to such practises. There is increasing concern within CCAMLR that sigantories intent on 
IUU fishing are contracting observers with appropriate sympathies or as part of reciprocal 
arrangements. Secondly, evidence suggests that increasing numbers of non-reported vessels 
are seeking entry in CCAMLR managed waters, particularly later in the summer when the 
official season has closed following the completion of the TAC by notified vessels. Both 
methods pose significant challenges to the current management regime and the later in 
particular raises safety issues due to the general poor condition, ill equipped nature, and 
inappropriate design of vessels conducting IUU fishing.  
 
IUU fishing has further segregated those signatories who have traditionally conducted 
significant amounts of fish stock research in CCAMLR management waters (and have 
significant influence in the CCAMLR Commission meetings) on the one hand, and those who 
have shorter term fishery interests in region, on the other. The issue of IUU fishing has been 
trying for the EU due to the significant number of Spanish nationals contracted to IUU 
fishing operations. This has been embarrassing for the EU, and proved awkward to enforce 
as Community regulations on IUU fishing and jurisdiction of European nationals have to be 
adopted into EU member state law and a case brought before the respective national’s 
court. The EU has taken a strong stand on IUU fishing at CCAMLR and regularly brings 
forward information on IUU fishing operations obtaining by the Markets unit of DG Fish. This 
information may be used to build a case for the blacklisting of a vessel in CCAMLR waters 
and to apply political pressure of the country which the vessel is flagged to.  
In 2006, sufficient evidence was gathered that a Russian flagged vessel was fishing 
without the appropriate notification or permitting in the CCAMLR management area.11 The 
issue rose to a head when the Russian delegation blocked otherwise unanimous consensus, 
and in the face of significant evidence, at CCAMLR XXV for the vessel to be blacklisted. A 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that boats of several nationalities, including other CCAMLR signatories, have been caught 
IUU fishing in CCAMLR management waters. Russia is singled out in this example due to the issue over it blocking 
consensus.  
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broad consensus was build amongst Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Norway and the 
European Union, and Moscow was demarched over the incident. Interestingly, it appears 
that the EU member states while fully supporting the demarche, allowed the issue to be 
managed at EU level. This example further underscores the complexities of the EU 
arrangement and the delicacy of issues of competency between the European Commission 
and the EU member states. Recent regulations adopted by the Council of Ministers have 
approved new procedures for reporting IUU fishing in the CCAMLR area to the European 
Commission, as well as catch documentation information, and provided it scope for greater 
involvement (European Council of Ministers, 2006). 
 
Implications and Future Prospects 
Outside of trade arrangements, participation in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMOs) is one of the few forums where the European Commission exclusively 
represents the interest of the EU member states in an international setting. Ongoing 
manoeuvring evidenced in this paper between the European Commission and the Union 
member states with respect to the fisheries competencies of European occurs within a 
broader debate on both the value of the Union to its member states and, more specifically 
in this case, what are the appropriate principle for subsidiarity in the case of external 
relations.  
External relations portfolios are among the most desirable for an institution such as 
the European Commission which is intent on expanding its own policy remit; and are among 
the most contentious on the question of subsidiarity. With an appreciation that the 
institutional arrangements of the EU result in the European Commission ideally wishing to 
broaden its competencies: CCAMLR presents an ideal forum. There are, however, significant 
constraints to the wishes of the European Commission being met. Firstly, Britain and France 
provide a very real check on DG Fish in the CCAMLR forums due to their superior technical 
expertise in Antarctic fish stock management and the key role that their delegates have 
played within CCAMLR over the years. Secondly, the broader ‘living marine resources’ remit 
of the Convention, and the EU’s narrower ‘fishing management’ competencies create a 
mix-mash of obligations and capabilities which leads not only to the representation of EU 
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member states in the CCAMLR meetings, but their ability to shape the decision-making 
process on various issues. Thirdly, as research is solely a competency of the EU member 
states, it is difficult for DG Fish to wield the political influence expected of it due to its 
size and the scope of its activities – despite being expected to do so by many of the other 
CCAMLR signatories. It may be more accurate to attribute what some see as a lower level of 
engagement in CCAMLR meetings to the present limits of its competencies, and the active 
check of its competencies by its member states, rather than its general commitment to the 
agreement.  
 
There are signals that fundamental changes will take place within CCAMLR that may affect 
the existing power balance between the Commission and the member states. Firstly, 2007 
will see the retirement of the United Kingdom representative Mike Richardson and the 
Argentine representative, Ministro Ariel Mansi, seems unlikely to return to Commission 
meetings as nears the end of his career. These events mark a changing of the guard in 
CCAMLR and will provide opportunity for individuals to assume key positions with the 
Commission decision-making culture, and for signatories to explore new possibilities to 
address old interests.  
 Secondly, Council of Ministers Regulations such as 41/2006 (European Council of 
Ministers, 2006) and the decision to support DG Fish’s position on the fishing rights EU―non-
CCAMLR signatories show a gradual racheting up of the Commission’s responsibilities vis-à-
vis the EU member states at CCAMLR. Similar trends may be obervered in other areas that 
having a bearing on External Relations, and one would expect this process to continue ― 
albeit very gradually.  
 Thirdly, as a number of commentators note, for example Molenaar (2001), CCAMLR 
borader ‘living marine resources’ paradigm is increasing entering the RFMO vernacular 
following the Fish Stock Agreement and following high-levels of concern of global depletion 
of fish stocks. Consequently, there is a very real possibiliy that this issue will be forced onto 
the European agenda, with external EU fisheries management competencies having to be 
explicitly developed for these new regimes.  
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There has been very little research work done on the EU’s relationship with CCAMLR, 
despite it presenting an interesting case study for both observers of the EU in the global 
context and those interested in RFMOs. Consequently, there remains a great deal to be 
done. This paper has established an operational gap between the remit of the CCAMLR 
Convention and the competencies of the EU. This both limits the scope for greater EU 
involvement in CCAMLR and introduces greater complexities in formulating a European 
consensus than other RFMOs. There is also evidence to suggest that signatories to CCAMLR 
are not fully aware of the specific competencies of the EU in vis-à-vis its member states. 
Consequently, there remains institutional space for the EU to fill in the CCAMLR decision-
making process, should it be able to. Areas for further research include establishing the 
exact scope of the EU’s fisheries competencies in CCAMLR, and more detail studies of both 
how the EU formulates a common position and how the various levels of European 
representation shape CCAMLR decisions. The first goal requires a substantial knowledge of 
the European Treaties and legal system and the later two require frank, on-the-record 
interviews as the official documentation does not exist, or reflect these factors. This paper 
notes that there are a number of factors for change including the change of representative 
to the Commission in 2007, the gradual racheting up of DG Fish’s responsibilities vis-à-vis 
the EU member states and the implications of the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement. 
Each of these factors indicate the opportunity for DG Fish take a more central position in 
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